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Abstract 
This paper reviews several key implications of international investment and global supply chain 
fragmentation for the multilateral trading system. Based on existing economic research, I identify a 
two-fold challenge for policy makers: first, to leverage the trade-liberalizing potential of global 
fragmentation at the multilateral level; and second, to counter the potential for opportunistic 
manipulation of behind-the-border policy instruments. 
Keywords 
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1 Overview
The rapid rise in global fragmentation – international ownership and the ‘unbundling’
of production across borders, both within and outside the boundaries of the firm –
introduces new challenges for the World Trade Organization (WTO). This paper
distills the key implications of frontier research in economics to draw concrete policy
lessons for the multilateral trading system.
When the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was first ratified
in 1947, the notion of an ‘American’, ‘French’, or ‘German’ firm, tied to clearly
delineated production, trade, and ownership patterns, was intact. For the most part,
a country’s economic interests coincided with its geographic boundaries, and trade
between exporters in one country and importers in another generally took the form
of arms-length exchanges of raw materials, commodities, and final goods traded at
the border. In that environment, a ‘shallow’ agreement over tariffs and quotas was
largely capable of mitigating any opportunistic manipulation of international activity
by independent governments.
The multilateral trading system has grown increasingly complex in subsequent
decades. Globally fragmented supply chains, foreign investment, and cross-border
portfolio holdings have introduced new and deeper economic connections between
trading partners. Some of these connections make the job of the WTO easier –
for instance, governments may be induced to expand market access unilaterally in
response to their own constituents’ offshoring investments. But in other ways, global
fragmentation of production and ownership poses deep challenges for the WTO in
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its current form. Deeper economic integration through foreign investment or tightly
woven contractual relationships between foreign suppliers and domestic buyers of
customized intermediate goods could trigger opportunistic manipulation of behind
the border (BTB) instruments by both governments. The current shallow integration
mandate of the GATT/WTO is not equipped to counter the host of potential BTB
externalities between countries. Indeed, the recent surge in regional trade agreements
– many of which do carry powerful behind the border provisions – may be in part
a reflection of latent demand. Moreover, to the extent that regional agreements
allow some trading partners to leverage a reinforcing cycle of investment and trade
liberalization, they may undermine further multilateral talks.
Building from recent research on the economics of trade agreements, this paper
advocates a more nuanced understanding of governments’ unilateral policy objec-
tives in the presence of global fragmentation and international ownership. Discussion
proceeds in three parts.
The next section opens with a primer on the conceptual starting point: the
GATT/WTO as a “shallow” solution to a classic ‘terms-of-trade driven prisoners’
dilemma’. By outlining the canonical (economic) understanding of the role of the
GATT/WTO in the traditional national-ownership framework, it is then relatively
simple to ask how that traditional mercantilist understanding needs to be updated in
light of the global fragmentation/ownership phenomenon. I identify three key features
of fragmentation – foreign ownership, cross-border bargaining, and the length of global
supply chains – and demonstrate how they relate to the conventional understanding
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of market access and trade barriers.
Three broad conclusions emerge from this distillation of existing research. First,
international ownership introduces a potential ‘trade-investment complementarity’
that can induce governments to expand market access unilaterally but preferentially.
Second, both complex arms-length supply chain relationships as well as international
ownership introduce the potential for opportunistic manipulation of behind the border
policy instruments by national governments. Third, longer supply chains can magnify
the effects of existing trade barriers, particularly when rules of origin or value added
calculations are not carefully calibrated among trading partners.
A short third section of the paper then considers the recent proliferation of re-
gional agreements through the lens of this new framework. I first look at the extent
to which the rush to preferential agreements may reflect the underlying mechanisms
identified above, before considering the additional challenges that greater regional
fragmentation of both production and investment may post for the multilateral trad-
ing system.
The fourth and final section of the paper uses the earlier analysis to draw sev-
eral concrete policy suggestions for the WTO going forward. Most ideas are not new:
reduce policy uncertainty, synchronize rules of origin, protect investors from expropri-
ation – all with an eye to encouraging trade and efficiency enhancing investment and
sourcing patterns. A familiar caution is issued against regional agreements, particu-
larly those that leave substantial variation tariffs between the signatories in dubious
conformity with Article XXIV. Finally, I consider the case for integrating deeper in-
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tegration measures within the WTO umbrella – potentially including a cooperative
agreement to limit FDI subsidies.
2 Fragmentation through the Economic Lens
This section opens by briefly outlining the canonical (economic) view of the GATT/WTO
in the absence of global fragmentation – reviewing the Bagwell and Staiger (1999)
argument that together the core GATT principles of MFN and reciprocity act as a
simple and effective solution to the “shallow” market access conundrum known as
the ‘terms-of-trade driven prisoners’ dilemma’. Building on recent research, the re-
mainder of the section then extends this understanding of multilateral trade policy
to an environment with globally fragmented production and international ownership.
For the purposes of economic analysis, three key characteristics of the vast global in-
tegration phenomenon prove most important: international ownership, relationship-
specific bargaining between specialized buyers and sellers, and supply chain length-
ening that implies more border crossings embodied within the production of a final
good. We consider each in turn following the brief ‘terms-of-trade’ primer below.
2.1 A Brief Primer on the WTO Terms-of-Trade Theory
Readers familiar with the economics literature of trade agreements – specifically the
seminal work of Bagwell and Staiger (1999) – should feel free to skip ahead to the
next section. The next few paragraphs draw heavily from their work; the interested
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reader is referred to their excellent book on the topic, Bagwell and Staiger (2002).
At the most basic level, the role of any agreement is to create win-win (or
Pareto improving) outcomes: all parties should gain (or at least not lose) from signing
a treaty. Ergo there must be some inherent aggregate inefficiency embodied in the
pre-treaty world, such that the agreement can deliver Pareto gains.
In the context of trade policy, the economics literature long identified a single
source of pre-agreement inefficiency, the so-called ‘terms-of-trade externality.’ The
idea is simple: because large countries (by definition) affect world market clearing
prices, they do not bear the full burden their import tariffs, but rather shift part of
the tariff cost onto foreign exporters.1 Left to its own devices, a large country would
optimally set its tariffs inefficiently high from a world-welfare point of view. Whatever
a government’s domestic policy preferences (which could imply a positive ‘politically
optimal tariff’ – especially if import-competing lobby groups are politically active),
it will always have an incentive to push the tariff even further above this politically
optimal benchmark to exploit its market power via the terms-of-trade externality.
From here, the potential for a Pareto-improving trade agreement is immediate.
Because all large countries have the unilateral incentive to impose inefficiently high
‘cost-shifting’ tariffs, the treaty-less trading system is characterized by a terms-of-
trade driven prisoners’ dilemma: collectively and individually all countries would be
1When a country imposes an import tariff, it causes its demand (and thus total worldwide
demand) for that imported good to fall. The world price of the imported good declines as a result
of the diminished demand, and so the foreign exporters’ profit margins will shrink. In effect, the
foreign exporters thus bear part of the burden of the large country’s import tax.
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better-off if they could commit to not increasing their tariffs beyond the politically
optimal level. Bagwell and Staiger (1999) demonstrate that the twin pillars of the
GATT, MNF and reciprocity, achieve precisely this end. Reciprocity allows govern-
ments the means to make cooperative agreements to reduce tariffs in lock-step, thus
expanding market-access. MFN ensures that pairs of countries cannot manipulate
the terms-of-trade at the expense of excluded parties.
The Bagwell-Staiger understanding of trade agreements makes very few assump-
tions on governments’ underlying political objectives. Politically optimal tariffs are
left to capture a broad set of potential political machinations, and still the theory
implies that (1) in the absence of trade agreements non-cooperative (Nash) tariffs
would be inefficiently high; (2) a Pareto-improving agreement over tariffs would nec-
essarily help governments cooperatively reduce tariffs and expand market access; and
(3) because the terms-of-trade externality is the only source of international efficiency,
a “shallow” trade agreement over market access is sufficient for eliminating manip-
ulation governments’ incentives to manipulate trade policy at the expense of their
trading partners.
For nearly a decade, the prevailing view within the economic literature was
therefore that the shallow integration mandate of the GATT/WTO embodied in the
in core principles of MFN and reciprocity was sufficient to fully exhaust the potential
gains from multilateral trade negotiations. More recently, this view has been extended
in the context of foreign ownership, offshoring, and global supply chains by Antras
and Staiger (2012a), Blanchard (2007) and (2010), Baldwin, Evenett, and Low (2009),
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and Baldwin (2010) among others.
2.2 Trade Liberalization through International Ownership
Although conceptually distinct, global fragmentation and international ownership fre-
quently go hand-in-hand as part of the same deep economic integration phenomenon.
In many instances, global supply chains embody foreign direct investment and thus
international ownership, though clearly international ownership need not imply pro-
duction fragmentation or vice versa. Consider, for example, greenfield foreign direct
investment, joint ventures between foreign investors and domestic partners, or virtu-
ally any type of cross-border merger or acquisition, all of which imply foreign owner-
ship in one or more trading partners.2 Even international portfolio diversification by
individual investors (or sovereign wealth funds) constitutes a transfer of ownership
across borders.
Whatever the source, the ultimate effect of international ownership is to muddy
the distinction between national and foreign economic interests. The implied wedge
between a country’s economic interests and its geographic boundaries deals an im-
mediate blow to the traditional ‘us-versus-them’ mercantilist understanding of trade
policy as a competition between foreign interests abroad and domestic interests at
home. Intuitively, when domestic constituencies hold a direct economic stake in for-
2If the FDI is ‘vertical’, then we would consider it a source of both international ownership and
global fragmentation; if instead the FDI is market-seeking (‘horizontal’), then it would constitute
the former but not the latter.
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eign export markets, their home government has less incentive to levy tariffs on im-
ports.3 Indeed, in the limit in which countries held perfectly diversified international
portfolios – for instance, because of perfect international risk sharing – all countries
would have identical economic interests. Absent the potential for expropriation (an
important caveat, which is discussed shortly), countries would unilaterally choose
globally efficient tariffs.4
Cross-border ownership stakes thus may partially (or even completely) sub-
stitute for the traditionally understood role of the GATT and its successor WTO to
cooperatively increase market access through (shallow) reciprocal, non-discriminatory
tariff concessions. Indeed, if all countries held sufficient ownership interests in their
trading partners’ export sectors, those overseas investment holdings could exactly
offset the beggar-they-neighbor ‘terms-of-trade cost-shifting’ externality that would
otherwise induce governments to restrict market access.
There are, however, two important qualifications. First, import competing in-
vestment would have no such effect. In fact, economic theory suggests quite the
opposite: foreign ownership in import-competing sectors – for instance because of
horizontal, or ‘tariff-jumping’ foreign direct investment– would only sharpen gov-
ernments’ incentives to restrict market access through tariffs. (Roughly speaking,
import competing investments abroad give a government an even greater vested in-
terest in improving the terms-of-trade – increasing the relative price of goods that it
3See Kemp (1966), Jones (1967), or Blanchard (2007).
4This point has been refined by Stockman and Dellas (1986), Devereux and Lee (1999), and
Blanchard (2010).
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both exports and, with horizontal investment, produces overseas directly.) Thus, it
is only vertical, or offshoring types of foreign investment and ownership that create
a potential ‘trade-investment complementarity’, whereby more investment in export-
oriented operations overseas induces the investing country’s government to expand
market access and (thus) trade.5
A second complication derives from the potential for preferential agreements.
While preferential agreements can allow governments to harness the trade-liberalizing
potential of international ownership, they also exacerbate potential exclusion of non-
signatory countries. Moreover, to the extent that international ownership is the result
of foreign direct investment, preferential agreements induce both trade and investment
diversion at the expense of excluded countries. Section 3 takes up these and related
issues in greater depth.
Importantly, the potential trade-liberalizing influence of foreign ownership finds
empirical support in practice. A recent study (Blanchard and Matschke (2014)) finds
strong evidence of a causal link between offshoring activity by U.S. foreign affiliates
and the structure of U.S. trade preferences. The effect is big, too – the baseline
estimation results indicate that a 10 percent increase in affiliate sales to the U.S.
leads to roughly a 4 percentage point increase in the rate of duty free access under
preferential trade programs – or a 20 percent expansion of the rate of preferential
5Baldwin (2010) points out an interesting caveat in the spirit of Kojima (1975): to the extent
that inward FDI in a downstream import-competing industry increases its political influence, that
FDI could induce tariff reductions on upstream industries (though this would require the political
impact of the downstream industry’s growth to outweigh the political cost of being ‘foreign’).
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market access relative to the mean. The trade-investment complementarity appears to
be more than an academic possibility; it demonstrates measurable practical relevance
today.
2.3 Expropriation, Bargaining, and BTB Policy Changes
A second key feature of global fragmentation lies in expanded opportunities for ma-
nipulation of behind the border (BTB) policy instruments by opportunistic govern-
ments. To the extent that WTO’s mandate extends to any government action that
would “produce an adverse effect on the balance of commercial activity,” as posited
by Hudec (1990) (pg 24), the growing scope for BTB policy abuse warrants explicit
attention in the evolving vision of the multilateral trading system.
Global fragmentation of production and ownership sharpens the incentives for
BTB policy manipulation in two ways. Most directly, foreign ownership of domestic
firms or resources introduces the potential for implicit expropriation by investment-
host country governments via BTB manipulation.6 When international investment
is ‘sunk’ in the short run – or if foreign investors earn above market returns in the
investment host country – the potential for rent extraction from foreign investors may
induce ‘rent shifting’ through domestic policy changes.7 Expropriative policy changes
need not be explicitly trade related – new taxes, technical barriers, regulations, or
6Partial foreign ownership would attenuate (but not eliminate) this expropriative motive. Host
governments would face a tradeoff, weighing potential rent capture from foreign interests against
the costs borne by domestic owners.
7This argument is developed formally in the trade policy context in Blanchard (2009).
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permit requirements could be structured in such a way to shift profits from foreign
investors to the host government or domestic firms or workers.
Crucially, lengthening global supply chains can introduce opportunistic BTB
policy changes even absent international ownership. When buyers and sellers trade
in highly specialized intermediate inputs – the kind of transactions that are increas-
ingly common as production becomes more fragmented – transaction prices are often
determined by bilateral bargaining, rather than traditionally understood market clean-
ing conditions. As Antras and Staiger (2012a) demonstrate, the bargaining process
can be opportunistically manipulated by governments of both countries through both
trade policy and behind-the-border policy changes. (The BTB channel is articulated
explicitly in Antras and Staiger (2012b).) Cooperative agreements over traditional
market access mechanisms thus may prove insufficient to reach globally efficient out-
comes.
Unfortunately, it is far easier to recognize the potential for BTB policy ma-
nipulation than it is to mitigate it in practice. While TRIMs protections are almost
certainly insufficient, as they apply only to trade related investment protections, much
broader investment protections – for example, like the provisions in the NAFTA’s
Chapter 11 – present their own problems. The key question going forward is which
design features at the multilateral level are necessary for mitigating opportunistic
BTB policies, and which, if any, of those ideal BTB policy guidelines can be opera-
tionalized in practice.8 Early progress on the topic has been made by Staiger (2011),
8In the current WTO legal framework, the subsidy designation requires financial contribution,
benefit, and specificity; this last dimension is arguably the most difficult to police.
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Staiger and Sykes (2011), and Antras and Staiger (2012b) , but these questions remain
an important topic for future research.
2.4 Supply Chains, Value Added, and ‘Taming the Tangle’
A third complication arises from the supply chains themselves. Blanchard, Bown, and
Johnson (2014) point out that supply-chain trade in intermediate inputs will alter
governments’ incentives to manipulate prices via trade policy. When a country’s
production of final goods embodies value added inputs from its trading partners,
changes in tariffs both at home and abroad will in general pass through at least partly
to the foreign value added producers. Depending on underlying political economy,
production processes, and market structure, value added trade can thus dampen
government’s incentives to increase tariffs beyond globally efficient levels.
Moreover, longer supply chains magnify the inefficiencies of existing trade bar-
riers. As global supply chains increasingly stretch around the world to incorporate
more border crossings, individual trade barriers (whether tariffs or NTMs) may be
applied to the same final product multiple times absent carefully synchronized rules of
origin (ROOs) or value added tariff rules. Even in the best case scenario with careful
(or no) ROOs and free trade, the bureaucratic and time cost of border crossings may
substantially increase the final price of a good. The fragmentation process essentially
increases the effective rate of protection, even if tariffs and other trade costs remain
unchanged. Moreover, to the the extent that border costs induce trade or investment
diversion, one can expect these problems to be magnified by global fragmentation.
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On a more optimistic note, Baldwin (2006) and more recently Baldwin, Evenett,
and Low (2009) articulate a potential counterweight via the political process. Multi-
national firms with long supply chains suffer most from the ‘tangle’ of complex re-
gional and bilateral agreements and asynchronous rules of origin. To the extent that
these firms have a voice in the political process, their advocacy to ‘tame the tangle’
may induce their governments to simplify trade restrictions and/or reduce trade barri-
ers unilaterally. Baldwin (2010) makes a different argument with a similar conclusion:
to the extent that fragmentation splinters old political alliances between upstream and
downstream industries or dramatically shifts the pattern of comparative advantage
along the global value chain, developing countries’ governments may gradually aban-
don long-standing infant-industry industrialization strategies, unilaterally lowering
their tariffs on upstream industries in particular.
But the devil is in the details – it very may well be the case governments’ efforts
to reduce and simply trade barriers apply differentially to trade partners with whom
their multinational firm constituents are already or soon to be involved. Countries
that are outside the global supply chain network may be left behind entirely, further
worsening the discrepancy between the highly integrated ‘have’ countries, and the
peripheral ‘have nots’. And this brings us to the next issue – how global fragmentation
impacts the previous understanding of regionalism as stepping stone or stumbling
block to freer multilateral trade.
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3 Regionalism and Fragmentation
Global fragmentation and regionalism are deeply intertwined. Preferential trade
agreements foster deeper economic integration between signatory countries, just as
stronger economic ties sharpen the impetus for greater policy coordination through
deeper regional agreements. Unfortunately, while preferential agreements may serve
as an important lever for harnessing a the trade liberalizing potential of international
investment, they may raise as many problems as they solve.
Consider the following thought experiment.9 A Canadian owned firm, XYZ
Corp, sets up a manufacturing facility in Thailand, producing shoes to sell back to
consumers in Canada. The investment is of the export-oriented offshoring type, and
so one would expect the Canadian government to want to improve market access for
XYZ corp’s foreign affiliate. (If XYZ Corp lobbies a receptive government, the effect
would be stronger, but in general the mechanism will obtain as long as the government
has any interest in XYZ Corp’s profitability, even if only for tax revenue.)
In an unrestricted trade policy environment, the Canadian government would
want to expand market access for just XYZ Corp’s foreign affiliate, but of course
national treatment rules prohibit discriminatory treatment at the firm level. Un-
der national treatment rules but in the absence of MFN, the Canadian government
would offer preferential treatment for all Thai shoes – but at the narrowest possible
product definition that includes XYZ Corp’s shipments. MFN rules out such dis-
cretionary treatment at the country-product level, and so the only opportunities to
9The subsequent discussion draws heavily from Blanchard (2007).
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exploit the trade liberalizing potential of XYZ Corp’s offshoring investment mani-
fest either through a preferential agreement (under Article XXIV or Enabling Clause
exemptions to MFN), or by reducing the MFN tariff on shoes for all trading partners.
Given the number of MFN trading partners worldwide, it is relatively unlikely
that MFN tariff reductions would follow from offshoring investment in just one trad-
ing partner. In practice, however, a handful of industries are characterized by such
widespread offshoring and supply chain fragmentation that perhaps they could in-
duce multilateral liberalization. One might argue that the Information Technology
Agreement (ITA) implemented in 1997 reflects this underlying mechanism.
In many industries, international ownership and offshoring investment is con-
centrated in a small number of trading partners. In that case, the investing country’s
government (i.e. Canada) might look for potential preferential arrangements with its
investment host(s) (i.e. Thailand). Article XXIV exemptions for free-trade agree-
ments in principle restrict the signatories to removing virtually all trade barriers for
virtually all goods. In practice, however, many preferential agreements leave substan-
tial barriers to trade for protected industries, which may make free trade deals easier
to sign. The crucial question is then whether the extent of ownership and supply-
chain integration in the host country as a whole is sufficient to induce a free trade
agreement given the institutional constraints. If it is, there is a new reason for (often
small and developing) potential investment-host countries to seek foreign investors
and global supply chain relationship from a large trading partner: doing so may earn
a preferential trade agreement and improved market access for local exporters.
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Two important cautions arise. First, preferential trade deals increasingly in-
corporate strong behind the border protections that are typically favored by multi-
national firms, but may be more problematic for investment-host countries. For ex-
ample, the NAFTA’s Chapter 11 carries powerful Investor State Dispute Settlement
(ISDS) provisions that protect foreign investors against local policy manipulation by
host country governments. To the extent that multinational firms are important ac-
tors in trade policy determination and strongly favor deeper policy integration and
BTB protections, the rapid rise in observed and potential global fragmentation can be
expected to accelerate the momentum behind greater and deeper preferential agree-
ments. If potential investment-host countries compete for foreign investment and
preferential trade agreements by signing BTB protections or investment subsidies
that are otherwise welfare-reducing, world welfare may fall.10
Second, preferential agreements may undercut multilateral liberalization. To
the extent that fragmentation or foreign investment spurs greater policy liberalization
through preferential agreements, and those agreements further deepen economic ties
as supply chains spread across signatories’ borders, the cycle of improved market
access and increased fragmentation may continue. At the same time, however, it
stands to fear that the same mechanism can lead to substantial trade and investment
diversion; just as some trading partners experience ever-greater economic integration
through a trade-investment complementarity, other countries may be left out entirely.
10Blanchard (2013) formalizes this argument, making an efficiency case for multilateral disciplines
on investment incentives.
16
4 Applying Research to Practice
I conclude by outlining a handful of policy implications that follow directly from the
economic arguments articulated above. The first three are clear, actionable points,
while the last three identify broader and more complex issues to be taken up in sub-
sequent work. The key challenge is twofold: first, to harness the trade-liberalizing
potential of international investment without exacerbating regional/preferential ex-
clusivity; and second, to counter potential opportunistic BTB policy manipulation
directly.
The first two policy suggestions are relatively straightforward means by which to
encourage deeper economic ties through foreign investment and supply chain integra-
tion, which in turn may induce governments to reduce tariffs and non-tariff barriers
unilaterally:
1. Simplify and synchronize rules of origin to reduce the implicit penalties faced
by long supply chains and fragmented production.11
2. Reduce policy uncertainty; fragmentation typically involves sunk investments
that are more readily undertaken in a stable policy environment. In the con-
text of current rules, uncertainty is perhaps best mitigated by enforcing limited
and judicious use of temporary trade measures (anti-dumping, CVDs, and safe-
guards) will serve to reduce uncertainty faced by exporters and, thus, potential
investors in export sectors.
11See, among others, Baldwin (2006) for a careful discussion of diagonal vs. full cumulation rules.
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The next point is more a policy caution than suggestion. It recognizes the
potential for fragmentation to increase governments’ demand for sharper trade policy
instruments: to the extent that narrowly defined policy instruments can be used
with surgical precision to benefit only key constituent beneficiaries (like a particular
multinational firm’s foreign affiliates in a particular market), any benefit of trade-
investment complementarity will accrue to just a handful of beneficiaries. Perhaps
the most important means to dissuade manipulation of targeted temporary remedies
is to maintain a strong, fast, fair, and effective dispute settlement process.
3. Limit the ability of antidumping and countervailing duties to discriminate (de
facto or de jure) at the country and firm level. When trade protections can be
defined at the firm (as in the case of AD duties) or very-narrow (10+ digit HS)
product-country level, they may be used to impose differential tariff treatment
against exports by preferred (foreign affiliate) vs. arms-length foreign suppliers.
The last three points identify two key areas on which the WTO should con-
sider in response to the global fragmentation of production and ownership. The first
simply reiterates the long-held and central concern over regional or preferential trade
agreements, noting that fragmentation may increase the urgency of the problem. The
second advocates direct consideration of deeper integration measures at the multilat-
eral level: unless deeper integration measures return to the multilateral negotiating
table, multinational firms – a key constituency in trade policy for many countries –
can be expected to continue to press for additional regional agreements rather than
multilateral negotiations. The third point echoes Blanchard (2013) in calling for
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renewed consideration of multilateral disciplines over investment incentives.
4. Consider Article XXIV. On the one hand, preferential agreements leverage the
trade-investment complementarity, allowing signatories to deepen economic ties
through trade, supply chain fragmentation, and cross-border investment, all of
which provide direct benefits. On the other, regionalism induces distortionary
trade and investment diversion, at the cost of excluded countries. As the pace
of fragmentation quickens, regional ‘fortresses’ may become more inwardly fo-
cussed.
5. Return deep integration measures to the multilateral table. The recent pro-
liferation of deep preferential agreements demonstrates underlying demand for
deep integration provisions between signatory countries, which we may surmise
derive not least from multinational firms and international investors. Recent
evidence suggests the absence of deep BTB protections ultimately may under-
mine shallow multilateral integration through ever stronger and more exclusive
regional agreements.
6. Reconsider multilateral investment disciplines. There is growing concern that
potential FDI-host countries are engaged in a ‘race-to-the-bottom’ in investment
subsidies, and that this race may be intensified by the potential for Article
XXIV-style trade deals. If true, there is a strong efficiency argument in favor
of a cooperative agreement to limit implicit and explicit subsidies to foreign
investors.
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These last points are both the most contentious and the most difficult to imple-
ment in practice. It is clear that deep integration measures can protect foreign firms,
investors, and cross-border relationships from BTB policy manipulation, and thus
have the potential, if done right, to enrich the economic ties between signatory coun-
tries. Lawrence (2011) recently proposed a two tiered system within the WTO, one
that would supplement the core GATT obligations with optional, add-on plurilateral
deep-integration agreements into which countries could opt-in or out. The key, notes
Lawrence, is to offer a WTO-based framework that is more attractive than regional
agreements. The move away from RTAs cannot be forced – but perhaps it can be
coerced by creating a better alternative.
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